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THE ADOPTION OF THE ABA STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS BY THE
ALASKA SUPREME COURT - IN RE
BUCK4LEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
adopted the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Stan-
dards") in February 1986.1 Concerns about inconsistent applications
of sanctions for attorneys' violations of ethical standards led to the
formulation and approval of the ABA Standards.2 Such inconsisten-
cies, involving violations of similar rules in the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility 3 and the more recent Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,4 have occurred not only among various jurisdictions but also
within the same jurisdiction.5
The ABA Standards attempt to address the problem of
nonuniformity by providing a framework of available sanctions, 6 and a
process for analyzing disciplinary offenses in order to arrive at a rec-
ommended sanction. 7 The ABA Standards also list potential aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors which are to be considered only after a
recommended sanction has been identified. 8
The Alaska Supreme Court applied the ABA Standards in In re
Buckalew9 to disbar Robert J. Buckalew for violations of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. i0 The Buckalew decision repre-
sents the first use of the ABA Standards in an Alaska attorney disci-
pline case. They were introduced during the final stage of the state
attorney discipline process. The Alaska Supreme Court used the ABA
1. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1986) (approved by the
ABA House of Delegates in February 1986) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
2. Id. Preface at 1-3.
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
5. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preface at I nn.2-3 (citing In re Gold, 77 Ill.
2d 224, 396 N.E. 2d 25 (1979); In re Oliver M.R. 2454, 79-CH-6 (1980)).
6. Id. Black Letter Rules, § 2, at 7-9.
7. Id. Black Letter Rules, § 3.0, at 9. See also id. Theoretical Framework at 5.
8. Id. § 9.0, at 15.
9. 731 P.2d 48 (Alaska 1987).
10. Id.
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Standards to recommend a more severe sanction than the one recom-
mended by the counsel for the Alaska Bar Association.'I
The introduction of the ABA Standards by the Alaska Supreme
Court is an important development in the evolution of the attorney
discipline process in Alaska. The use of the new standards should pro-
vide more consistency in the application of sanctions imposed for dis-
ciplinary violations and lead to a greater degree of certainty about the
penalties for misconduct. If other state courts adopt the ABA Stan-
dards, discipline may be standardized among other states as well as
within Alaska.
This note examines the ABA Standards adopted in the Buckalew
decision. Section II addresses the ABA Standards and their develop-
ment. The distinction between the new standards and the imposition
of sanctions in past Alaska cases is noted in Section III. Section IV
summarizes the facts of the Buckalew decision. While it is too early to
assess the effe ctiveness of the new ABA Standards in Alaska, possible
implications of the supreme court decision are analyzed in Section V.
Section VI concludes that the application of the ABA Standards will be
effective in standardizing disciplinary law in Alaska, if the standards
are used uniformly at all levels of the state attorney discipline process.
II. THE ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS -
AN OVERVIEW OF THEIR BACKGROUND AND
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
A. The Adoption of the ABA Standards by the American Bar
Association in 1986
Before the adoption of the ABA Standards by the ABA House of
Delegates in February 1986, there were few guidelines for the imposi-
tion of attorney sanctions once a violation of professional responsibil-
ity had been determined to exist.' 2 The previous authority for the
imposition of sanctions was the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and
Disability Proceedings ("1979 Standards") adopted by the House of
Delegates in 1979.13 The 1979 Standards contained model rules for
judicial and attorney discipline. They did not, however, contain spe-
cific recommendations for sanctions to be applied for each offense.
Standard 7.1 of the 1979 Standards stated that the sanction should
11. Id. at 56.
12. See generally Cameron, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions - A Long
Overdue Document, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91, 94-95 (1987) (The Honorable Justice Cam-
eron served as the Chairman of the Committee which developed the ABA STAN-
DARDS. This article provides an overview of the history and methodology of the
project.).
13. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS
(1979).
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"depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case, should be fash-
ioned in light of the purpose of lawyer discipline, and may take into
account aggravating or mitigating circumstances."' 4 The Alaska
Supreme Court noted in Buckalew that the 1979 Standards were simi-
lar to the Alaska standard used before Buckalew, which required the
balancing of all relevant factors in each particular case.15
Under the 1979 Standards, inconsistencies in the application of
sanctions among jurisdictions and within the same jurisdiction contin-
ued to occur. 16 The Preface to the ABA Standards cites one example
in which the same jurisdiction imposed different sanctions for failure
to file income tax returns - one attorney was suspended for a year
while the other was only censured. 7
The ABA established a Joint Committee on Professional Sanc-
tions (the "Committee") to make recommendations for achieving a
greater measure of consistency in the imposition of sanctions. Justice
Cameron, the Chairman of the Committee, indicated that the state-
ment of purpose adopted by the Committee was based on a finding in
the 1970 report of the Clark Committee.' 8 The 1970 report recog-
nized the need for standards for enforcing the existing ethical rules
formulated by the ABA:
For lawyer discipline to be truly effective, sanctions must be based
on clearly developed standards. Inappropriate sanctions can under-
mine the goal of lawyer discipline; sanctions which are too lenient
fail to adequately deter misconduct and thus, lower public confi-
dence in the system and deter lawyers from reporting ethical viola-
tions on the part of other lawyers. Inconsistent sanctions, either
within a jurisdiction or among jurisdictions, cast doubt on the effi-
ciency in the basic fairness of all disciplinary systems.' 9
The Committee examined all reported lawyer discipline cases
from 1980 through June 1984, as well as cases for a ten-year period
from eight jurisdictions. 20 After compiling these cases, the Committee
attempted to identify patterns and formulate recommendations. It
found that courts were fairly consistent in identifying the policy con-
siderations which are relevant in discipline cases. 2' These considera-
tions include "protecting the public, ensuring the administration of
14. Id. § 7.1.
15. 731 P.2d 48, 51 n.9 (Alaska 1986).
16. See Cameron, supra note 12, at 94.
17. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preface at I nn.2-3 (citing In re Gold, 77 Ill.
2d 224, 396 N.E.2d 25 (1979); In re Oliver, M.R. 2454, 79-CH-6 (1980)).
18. ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (Final Draft
June 1970).
19. ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems
and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 167 (1970).
20. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 2.
21. Id. at 2-3.
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justice, and maintaining the integrity of the profession. ' 22 Neverthe-
less, the Committee did not find the same consistency in the imposi-
tion of sanctions, concluding instead that "the courts failed to
articulate any theoretical framework for use in imposing sanctions. '23
The Committee considered several approaches before it adopted
the framework contained in the ABA Standards. It rejected the ap-
proach of identifying every possible type of misconduct and recom-
mending a sanction.24 Also rejected were approaches which looked
only at the intent of the lawyer or the extent of the injury. 25 Instead,
the Committee sought an alternative approach that focused on the eth-
ical duty of the attorney, although both the intent of the lawyer and
the extent of the injury are relevant in the broader theoretical frame-
work of the discipline process.2 6
The approach developed by the Committee involves a process
which progresses through several steps in order to arrive at a recom-
mended sanction. The process "looks first at the ethical duty and to
whom it is owed, and then at the lawyer's mental state and the amount
of injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct," resulting in "an organi-
zational framework that provides recommendations as to the type of
sanction that should be imposed based on violations of duties owed to
clients, the public, the legal system and the profession. ' 27 Under this
framework, the disciplinary body is to initially identify the appropriate
sanction without regard to aggravating or mitigating factors. 28
The Committee recognized that the existence of mitigating or ag-
gravating factors could lead to the imposition of a different sanction
from that recommended as a result of the initial process. The Com-
mittee made it clear, however, that the assessment of the weight of
these factors should be conducted only after the initial analysis of the
misconduct has taken place. By separating the assessment of sanctions
into two phases, the Committee hoped to increase consistency in the
results. When aggravating and mitigating factors are viewed at the
initial assessment stage, they may obscure the true nature of the act
committed and the resulting harm to the injured party.29 A separate
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id.
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standard for this second phase was therefore created, listing the poten-
tial aggravating and mitigating factors which can be taken into
account.30
The Committee also recognized that attorneys often apply for re-
instatement after suspension or disbarment, although this issue is not a
focus of the ABA Standards. The brief standard which mentions this
issue notes that some states allow reinstatement after disbarment while
others do not. It does call specifically for the adoption of procedures
30. Id. Black Letter Rules, §§ 9.1-.4, at 15. The Aggravation and Mitigation sec-
tion reads in relevant part:
9.22 Factors which may be considered in aggravation.
Aggravating factors include:
(a) prior disciplinary offenses;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intention-
ally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;(0) indifference to making restitution.
9.32 Factors which may be considered in mitigation.
Mitigating factors include:
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify conse-
quences of misconduct;
(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative atti-
tude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) character or reputation;
(h) physical or mental disability or impairment;
(i) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(j) interim rehabilitation;
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(1) remorse;
(m) remoteness of prior offenses.
9.4 Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating.
The following factors should not be considered as either aggravating or
mitigating:
(a) forced or compelled restitution;
(b) agreeing to the client's demand for certain improper behavior or
result;
(c) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(d) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(e) complainant's recommendation as to sanction;
(f) failure of injured client to complain.
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for attorneys to apply for readmission to the bar after suspension. 3'
Such distinctions are relatively unimportant in a state such as Alaska
where the procedures for applying for reinstatement are the same in
cases involving either disbarment or suspension.32 Procedures for re-
admission are more relevant in those states such as New York where
disbarment can be permanent. 33 A number of the members of the
Committee believed that disbarment should be permanent. 34 They de-
ferred to the varied practices of the states, however, and made the
ABA Standards consistent with the majority practice of allowing
reinstatement. 35
B. The ABA Standards Model for Imposing Discipline
The Committee adopted a model framework for courts to use in
imposing lawyer discipline. The framework is based on four questions
which courts should answer to arrive at the appropriate level of sanc-
tion. These questions are:
(1) What ethical duty did the lawyer violate? (A duty to a client,
the public, the legal system, or the profession?)
(2) What was the lawyer's mental state? (Did the lawyer act inten-
tionally, knowingly, or negligently?)
(3) What was the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by
the lawyer's misconduct? (Was there a serious or potentially serious
injury?) and
(4) Are there any aggravating or mitigating circumstances? 36
The types of potential sanctions range from disbarment to admo-
nition and other sanctions and remedies that the disciplinary body
finds appropriate. 37 The ABA Standards are organized so that the
types of duties are listed in order of importance, 38 with the duty to the
client being the most important.39 Subparagraphs then list the appro-
priate sanction for each mental state and level of injury caused by the
violation of a duty. For example, standard 4.11 states that "disbar-
ment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client
property and causes injury or potential injury to a client." 40 The ABA
31. Id. § 2.10, at 9.
32. See infra note 65.
33. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2), (4) (McKinney 1982).
34. Cameron, supra note 12, at 95.
35. Id. at 95-96.
36. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Theoretical Framework at 5. See also id.,
Black Letter Rules, § 3.0, at 9.
37. Id. Black Letter Rules, § 2, at 7-9.
38. Id. §§ 4.0-7.0, at 9-14.
39. Id. Theoretical Framework at 5 ("[T]he Standards assume that the most im-
portant ethical duties are those obligations which a lawyer owes to clients." (emphasis
in original)).
40. Id. Black Letter Rules and Commentary, § 4.11, at 26.
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Standards also follow the pattern of other ABA guidelines such as the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct by supplying explanatory com-
ments after each standard. 41
C. Uncertain Impact of the ABA Standards
It is too soon to assess the overall impact of the ABA Standards,
since they have only recently been adopted.42 The ABA Standards are
not expected to be permanent, but rather, they represent a "first at-
tempt at consistency in the inconsistent field of lawyer discipline." '43
The Committee also expressed the need for courts and disciplinary
authorities to report their decisions, and the reasoning underlying
those decisions, so that a body of opinions is generated which will aid
in the achievement of consistency. 44
The regulation counsel for the ABA Center for Professional Re-
sponsibility defined the ABA Standards in terms of their effect on the
judiciary:
Having these standards, we can't lose because the purpose of them
is to get judges to articulate bases for their decisions on what sanc-
tions to impose. I can speak for the whole committee in saying that
if not one state ever agreed with one of our standards or even the
underlying basis to be considering in imposing standards, but did
look at them and came up with their own rational basis for disagree-
ing, then we've still got what we wanted. 45
While the impact of a gradual evolution of standards from reasoned
opinions is not yet apparent, it is possible to suggest some changes
which the application of the ABA Standards should bring about in a
particular state, such as Alaska.
III. PAST DISCIPLINARY SANCTION PRACTICE IN ALASKA
Initial complaints of attorney misconduct in Alaska are referred
to Area Hearing Committees, which may refer the matter to the Disci-
plinary Board of the Alaska Bar Association. 46 One or both of the
parties may refer the matter to the Alaska Supreme Court, which has
ultimate jurisdiction over attorney discipline.47 The Alaska Supreme
Court may also choose to review the matter at its discretion, as it did
in Buckalew.48
41. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
42. Cameron, supra note 12, at 101.
43. Id. at 101.
44. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preface at 2.
45. Blodgett, Mixed Reviews for ABA Discipline Standards, 11 BAR LEADER 25,
26 (1986).
46. See, e.g., In re Stump, 621 P.2d 263, 263 (Alaska 1980).
47. See Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 51 (Alaska 1986).
48. Id. at 50.
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There are few attorney discipline case proceedings reported in
Alaska. The Committee found only eight reported cases between 1980
and June 1984.49 When cases do arrive at the higher levels of the at-
torney discipline process, the sanction imposed is often more severe
than the sanction originally recommended at the local level.50
The previous standard for assessing sanctions for lawyer miscon-
duct in Alaska was the "balanced consideration of [all] relevant fac-
tors" test articulated in In re Minor.5' The factors to be considered as
set forth by the Minor court included "whether there are mitigating
circumstances, what efforts the respondent [lawyer] has made to rem-
edy the problem, and the respondent's prior disciplinary record."'5 2
The Alaska Supreme Court also made reference to the 1979 Stan-
dards in other attorney discipline cases.53 As the court stated in Buck-
alew, the 1979 Standards were similar to the procedure used in Minor,
since no comprehensive guidelines were provided for the disciplinary
sanction to be imposed for particular types of misconduct.5 4 In both
of these articulations of a similar standard, the aggravating and miti-
gating factors were assessed at the same time as the nature of the mis-
conduct and the injury. 5
Alaska disciplinary cases contain several examples of inconsisten-
cies. There are inconsistent results within different hearing levels in
the same case, and within different opinions written for the same case.
In In re Stump, the Area Hearing Committee recommended a one-
year suspension from the practice of law for the falsification of an item
of documentary evidence.56 The Disciplinary Board and the Alaska
Supreme Court disagreed with the recommendation, proposing instead
that the period of suspension should be five years.57 In Stump, there
was a dissenting opinion which assessed the relevant factors differently
from the majority and recommended different penalties for the attor-
ney misconduct.58
49. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, App. 3, at 62. Alaska had eight cases which
accounted for 0.3% of the total cases considered in the study.
50. See, e.g., 731 P.2d at 56; Stump, 621 P.2d at 264; In re Preston, 616 P.2d 1, 3
(Alaska 1980).
51. 658 P.2d 781, 784 (Alaska 1983) (quoting Spindell v. State Bar of California,
13 Cal. 3d 253, 261, 530 P.2d 168, 174, 118 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1975)).
52. Id. at 784.
53. See, e.g., Stump, 621 P.2d at 265.
54. 731 P.2d at 51 n.9.
55. See Minor, 658 P.2d at 784. See also In re Simpson, 645 P.2d 1223, 1228
(Alaska 1982); In re Preston, 616 P.2d 1, 7 (Alaska 1980).
56. 621 P.2d at 264.
57. Id. at 266.
58. Id. at 269-70 (Connor, J., dissenting in part, and Burke, J., dissenting); 616
P.2d at 8 (Connor, J., and Burke, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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IV. THE BUCKALEW DECISION
The Buckalew case came to the Alaska Supreme Court as the re-
sult of a stipulation for discipline between Buckalew and the counsel
for the Alaska Bar Association. The stipulation was filed with the
Alaska Supreme Court according to statutory procedure.5 9 The agree-
ment was reached after Buckalew reported his own unethical conduct.
Buckalew had misrepresented the result of an action to a client and
then embezzled funds from two segregated trust accounts in order to
pay the client for a supposed settlement when the action had actually
been dismissed. 60 Buckalew's attorney notified all of the relevant par-
ties61 including the Alaska Bar Association. The Alaska Supreme
Court suspended Buckalew while the action was pending.62
After a hearing before the Alaska Bar Association Board of Gov-
ernors, Buckalew and the Discipline Counsel of the Alaska Bar Asso-
ciation entered into a stipulation for discipline by consent on August
29, 1985. This stipulation, which is allowed under Alaska Bar Rule
22(h),63 stated that Buckalew had violated four provisions of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 64 The stipulation further
provided that he would be suspended for five years, with reinstatement
59. Alaska Bar Rule 22(h) provides in relevant part:
Respondent may tender a conditional consent to a specific discipline con-
tained in Rule 16. This conditional consent will be submitted to Discipline
Counsel for his or her approval. If accepted by Discipline Counsel, (s)he
will refer the conditional admission to the Board for its approval or rejection
of the requested discipline.
Acceptance of the conditional consent by the Board will be subject to
Court approval if the specific discipline to be imposed includes discipline
provided in Rule 16(a)(I),(2),(3) and (4). Any conditional admission re-
jected by the Board or the Court will be withdrawn ....
If the Court or the Board rejects a conditional consent, the matter will
be remanded to the Hearing Committee ....
ALASKA BAR RULE 22(h).
60. 713 P.2d at 49.
61. The relevant parties included the Alaska Bar Association, state and federal
law enforcement agents, the affected clients and the bankruptcy court.
62. 713 P.2d at 49. Alaska Bar Rule 26(d) imposes suspension when "conduct by
an attorney.., constitutes a substantial threat of irreparable harm to his or her clients
or prospective clients or where there is a showing that the attorney's conduct is caus-
ing great harm to the public by a continuing course of misconduct." ALASKA BAR
RULE 26(d).
63. See supra note 59.
64. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980). The four provi-
sions are DR 9-102 (requirement to preserve identity of client's funds), DR 1-
102(A)(3) (prohibition from engaging in moral turpitude), DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibi-
tion from conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) and DR 1-
102(A)(6) (prohibition from conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law).
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conditioned upon compliance with Alaska Bar Rule 29(b). 65 Alaska
Bar Rule 22(h) requires that such a stipulation be acceptable to the
Board of Governors and the Alaska Supreme Court.66 The stipulation
was approved by the Board of Governors and filed with the Alaska
Supreme Court.67
The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the stipulation and entered
an order requiring Buckalew to show cause why he should not be dis-
barred. Both Buckalew and the Discipline Counsel for the Alaska Bar
Association ("Bar Counsel") filed briefs in response which highlighted
the mitigating factors in the case and urged that the stipulation be
accepted. The Bar Counsel also requested that the Alaska Supreme
Court follow the procedures outlined in Alaska Bar Rule 22(h) 68 if it
did not accept the stipulation. Rule 22(h) would require the matter to
go before a full Bar Association Hearing Committee rather than have
the Alaska Supreme Court make its own determination of the proper
sanction for the rules violation.
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected the recommendation of the
Bar Counsel for a five-year suspension. The court relied on the ABA
Standards in holding that the appropriate sanction was disbarment. 69
Two of the five justices disagreed with the decision and found that
suspension was the appropriate sanction given the mitigating factors
present in the case.70 The case was remanded to the Alaska Bar Asso-
ciation for further proceedings in order to comply with Alaska Bar
Rule 22(h).71 The Alaska Supreme Court emphasized that it held the
final responsibility for approving the appropriateness of disciplinary
sanction decisions.72
The Alaska Supreme Court first explained that it was utilizing the
ABA Standards because they provided a "comprehensive system" for
65. Former Alaska Bar Rule 29(b) required disbarred attorneys to satisfy certain
criteria before admission, while former Rule 29(c) allowed automatic reinstatement
upon filing a verified petition for attorneys who had been suspended. Rule 29 has now
been amended to apply the stricter requirements to all attorneys disbarred or sus-
pended for more than one year. ALASKA BAR RULE 29.
66. See supra note 59.
67. 731 P.2d at 50.
68. See supra note 59.
69. 731 P.2d at 56.
70. Id. (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Moore, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 56.
72. Id. at 51 n.7 ("It is our duty to discipline lawyers who indulge in practices
inconsistent with the high ethical standards imposed upon the legal profession in this
state. In determining the appropriate sanction to be imposed, we need not accept the
Board's recommendation but may exercise our own independent judgment." (citations
omitted)).
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determining sanctions. 73 The previous standard, which had been ar-
ticulated in In re Minor, called for a balanced consideration of relevant
factors, but did not make any attempt to match sanctions with attor-
ney conduct. 74 The court adopted the ABA Standards with the follow-
ing statement:
The ABA Standards and the methodology that they provide are
sound. They combine clear, straight-forward guidelines which en-
sure a level of consistency necessary for fairness to the public and
the legal system with the flexibility and creativity essential to secure
justice to the disciplined lawyer. Therefore, we will refer to the
ABA Standards and methodology as an appropriate model for deter-
mining sanctions for lawyer misconduct in this state.75
Upon adopting the ABA Standards, the court applied the four-
factor test provided by the guidelines. 76 The court found it unneces-
sary to consider the first three factors of the test extensively because of
the stipulation. The ethical duty violated, the lawyer's mental state
and the extent of the injury caused were all clear from the facts which
had been agreed upon in the case. The court found that "Buckalew
intentionally and knowingly violated ethical duties to his clients, the
public and the legal system, which caused injury and potential serious
injury."'77
The Buckalew court looked next to the sanctions recommended
in the ABA Standards for the type of injury involved in the case. The
court found that all four standards that Buckalew had violated -
knowing conversion of client funds, deceptive conduct, commission of
criminal acts and abuse of the legal process - have a recommended
sanction of disbarment. 78
73. 731 P.2d at 51-52.
74. In re Minor, 658 P.2d 781, 784 (Alaska 1983). The Alaska Supreme Court
pointed out that this standard was similar to that provided in the ABA Standards for
Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings. Buckalew, 731 P.2d at 51 n.9.
75. 731 P.2d at 52.
76. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 36.
77. 731 P.2d at 53.
78. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Black Letter Rules, §§ 4.0-6.2, at 9-13. The
four ABA Standards involved are: Standard 4.11 (knowing conversion of property
causing injury or potential injury to client), Standard 4.61 (deceiving client with intent
to benefit lawyer or another causing serious injury or potential serious injury to a
client), Standard 5.11(a) (engaging in serious criminal conduct with a necessary ele-
ment which includes intentional interference with administration of justice, misrepre-
sentation, fraud, misappropriation, theft), and (b) (engaging in intentional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation with serious adverse reflection
on fitness to practice), Standard 6.21 (knowing violation of court order or rule with
intent to obtain benefit for lawyer or another causing serious injury or potentially
serious injury to a party or causes serious or potentially serious interference with legal
proceeding).
1989]
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The court applied the last part of the four-part test by looking for
aggravating and mitigating factors. While a number of the mitigating
factors on the list included in the ABA Standards79 were set forth in
the stipulation,80 the court found that these factors did not justify a
reduction of the recommended sanction. Stating that "[t]here is no
'magic formula' to determine which or how many mitigating circum-
stances justify the reduction of an otherwise appropriate sanction,"' s
the court listed several reasons for refusing to recommend suspension.
First, the court reiterated that its primary duty is to protect the
public and that such grave misconduct warrants disbarment even if it
is an isolated incident.82 Second, it discussed the severity of the viola-
tion, especially the mishandling of client funds. 83 The court also con-
sidered the need for internal bar sanctions because of the position of
trust occupied by lawyers. 84 Finally, it stated that the actual punitive
effect of suspension and disbarment might be the same.85 The court
concluded that "[o]ur paramount concern, here as always, must be the
protection of the public, the courts, and the legal profession." '8 6
Chief Justice Rabinowitz and Justice Moore dissented in part to
the result reached by the majority. 87 They objected to the rejection of
the recommended discipline of a five-year suspension. 8 They noted
the presence of mitigating factors sufficient to lighten the otherwise
appropriate penalty of disbarment. These factors included a psychia-
trist's finding that Buckalew was suffering from emotional and psycho-
logical problems at the time of the misconduct and might have been
making a "professional suicide attempt." 89 While this factor did not
excuse Buckalew's conduct, it was relevant to the issue of intent,
which is one of the prongs of the ABA Standards test.90 His motives
were not purely "greed or evil intent." 9 1
79. See supra note 30.
80. 731 P.2d at 50 n.6. The listed mitigating factors included that Attorney
Buckalew had diagnosed emotional problems during the period of misconduct, had no
prior record of misconduct, made full disclosure and restitution (through his law
firm), cooperated with Bar Association and law enforcement authorities, was remorse-
ful and recognized his wrongdoing and did not use the embezzled funds for personal
use.
81. Id. at 54.
82. Id. at 54-55.
83. Id. at 55.
84. Id.
85. Id. See also supra note 65.
86. 731 P.2d at 56.
87. Id. (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Moore, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Moore, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 56-57 (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting psychiatric
report of Dr. Deborah Geeseman).
90. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Black Letter Rules, § 3.0(b), at 9.
91. 731 P.2d at 57 (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Moore, J., dissenting).
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The dissenting justices proceeded to note the other mitigating fac-
tors from the list provided in the ABA Standards which were present
in the case. Buckalew had no record of misconduct prior to the events
in question. 92 He made full disclosure of his misconduct and ex-
pressed remorse, and his law firm made full restitution of the embez-
zled funds.93 Also, Buckalew had already been sentenced by the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska for the crime of
embezzlement by a trustee, the same conduct considered in the case
before the Alaska Supreme Court.94 The dissent noted that none of
the money was used for Buckalew's personal consumption. 95 Most of
the same factors were noted by the majority, but the dissent concluded
that these circumstances had enough weight to mitigate the otherwise
appropriate sanction of disbarment. Like the majority, the dissenting
justices noted that suspension leads to the same practical consequences
as disbarment, 96 but that the stigma of the latter is greater. The dis-
sent concluded that the procedures for reinstatement provide the same
level of protection to the public as disbarment. 97
V. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTION OF ABA STANDARDS FOR ALASKA
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT CASES
The implications of the Buckalew decision adopting the ABA
Standards as the method for assessing the appropriate sanctions for
attorney ethics violations in Alaska are difficult to evaluate at this
time. The result in one case does not provide enough material to allow
a judgment of the effectiveness of the guidelines in fulfilling the broad
purpose of the ABA Standards, which is to eliminate or reduce differ-
ences among sanctions given for similar misconduct. 98 Some changes
may be needed in Alaska if the Alaska Supreme Court plans to make
the ABA Standards effective in achieving consistency.
Since few cases ever reach the Alaska Supreme Court, 99 the major
impact of any change will have to come at the local level. The local
level of the regional hearing system will have to adopt the ABA Stan-
dards approach when considering ethics violations in order for the
new guidelines to have broad effect.
92. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Black Letter Rules, § 9.32(a), at 15.
93. Id. § 9.32(e), at 15.
94. See 731 P.2d at 49 n.1 (Buckalew received a five-year suspended sentence for
the felony of embezzlement of property by a trustee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 153).
95. Id. at 57 n.4. (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Moore, J., dissenting).
96. 731 P.2d at 57 (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Moore, J., dissenting). See ALASKA
BAR RULE 29(b)(5); see supra note 65.
97. 731 P.2d at 57 (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Moore, J., dissenting).
98. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 49.
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In particular, a specific attempt will have to be made to encourage
the use of the two-step process in determining penalties. Until the
Buckalew decision, the Alaska Supreme Court had joined other state
disciplinary bodies in combining all of the aggravating and mitigating
factors with the basic facts to determine whether misconduct oc-
curred.'00 The ABA Standards should create more consistency in the
initial stages of the process which involve defining the misconduct and
matching it to the appropriate sanction. The assessment of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors is less likely to become consistent because of
the unique combination of these factors in each incident of miscon-
duct. While these factors are listed in the ABA Standards, as are fac-
tors which should not be considered in aggravation or mitigation,' 0 '
the specific impact of each type of factor is not defined. There is no
effort to rank them or to match them to any specific reduction in sanc-
tion. The difference in assessments of the role of additional factors can
be seen in Buckalew, where the dissenting opinion weighed the same
mitigating factors as the majority and argued that these factors did
compel a reduction in the sanction defined by the ABA Standards. 102
If the minimum goal of the ABA Standards is to encourage courts
to analyze the reasons for their decisions more carefully and to report
the factors which led to the imposition of particular sanctions,'0 3 then
the Buckalew opinion indicates that this goal may be reached in
Alaska. The Alaska Supreme Court made a careful and well-reasoned
application of the test defined by the ABA Standards, articulating rea-
sons at each step of analysis. The goal will be reached more effectively
if the regional hearing boards are encouraged to follow similar
procedures.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent Buckalew decision, in which the Alaska Supreme
Court adopted the ABA Standards, should alter the way attorney mis-
conduct is assessed in Alaska. The separation of the determination of
the appropriate sanction from the weighing of additional factors
should clarify the disciplinary process. More effort may be needed to
clarify the role of aggravating and mitigating factors and to standard-
ize their application because the ABA Standards do not attempt to go
beyond listing relevant factors. The additional effort to explain deci-
sions should lead to the formation of a body of case law which will
100. In re Stump, 621 P.2d 263, 266 (Alaska 1980).
101. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Black Letter Rules, § 9.4, at 15.
102. Buckalew, 731 P.2d at 54 (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Moore, J., dissenting).
103. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 2. See also text accompanying note
40.
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allow penalties for similar misconduct to become more uniform over
time.
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